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From: Vic Williams
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2011
To: Doc Riojas
Subject: Bin Laden Assault
Friends- I am honored to be able to forward these
comments from a friend who is a retired CIA Clandestine Services
officer. He was in Pakistan helping arm the Mujahadin against the
Russians and later served in Iran and was part of the aborted Desert One
attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran; Capt. John Spangler,
Intel. USN Ret.
Assault on Bin Laden
It is only 0500 on 2 May 2011 and I have already received a number of
emails and calls asking me to comment on the operation that resulted in
the death of Usama bin Laden (UBL.)
While it is early days in the wake of the assault, and I know nothing
more about it than we are all seeing on TV, I do know enough about the
area and the intelligence/tactical military requirements involved in an
attack like this (having been involved in similar situations) to be able
to make some comments on the intelligence aspects of the assault –
which I respectfully offer for your background information.
First … this was one hell of an intelligence job by the CIA Station in
Pakistan and supporting CIA elements elsewhere in the world. Without
such intelligence the attack could not possibly have been mounted. You
may be sure that the President would never repeat never have authorized
the assault without demanding – and receiving – a virtual
“guarantee” from CIA that UBL WAS at the target location; and that
CIA could provide sufficient on-the-ground current intelligence in the
period leading up to the assault so that our assault team would have NO
adverse “surprises.”
NO military assault of this sort could possibly be mounted without
having extraordinarily good intelligence. The risks of a) attacking the
“wrong” target (i.e., it was NOT one of UBL’s hang-outs); and of
b) attacking an “empty” target (i.e., it was a valid location, but
UBL was not there at the time of the assault); are enormous.
Consider: the following are just some of the adverse consequences if
either of the above had been the case:
We would have risked the lives of our assault team for nothing, since
“forts” such as this in Pakistan are always inhabited by heavily
armed defenders, no matter whether they are associated with UBL or not,
and they would have fought back with vigor.
The sheer embarrassment resulting from our attacking an invalid target
would have been crushing, domestically and around the world, and, fairly
or not, made the US the laughing stock of much of the world.
Anti-US blow-back in Pakistan would have been huge: probably resulting
in our being kicked out of the country, with enormous negative
consequences.
Al Quaeda and all the other anti-US terrorist organizations around the
world would have received a tremendous morale boost.
We can safely assume the following: Once focused on the possibility that
the target “compound” was a UBL refuge, CIA would have had to do the
following:
Mount unilateral visual surveillance on the compound (meaning
surveillance by CIA people only - NOT Pakistanis, since the presumption
is that no Pakistani, either from the Pak military or the Pak
intelligence services, could be considered to be absolutely and
sufficiently reliable.) Such surveillance would of necessity involved 24
hour “eyes-on” observation of the compound. The objectives of such
surveillance would be to (1) verify that the compound was used by UBL;
(2) establish that we could tell with a very high degree of certainty
when UBL was in the compound; (3) ascertain as much as possible about
the strength of the force defending UBL in the compound, including what
sort of armament was in their possession; and (4) determine the best
time to actually strike the compound in terms of guard shifts and
locations, and activity inside the compound.
Mount “technical coverage” of the compound: this would involve
scanning for radio signals coming from the compound; taking photographs
of the exterior of the compound; and arranging for aerial photographic
coverage of the compound.
Develop a scale model of the interior of the compound to be used by the
assault force in planning its movements and actions once it landed
inside the compound. The SEALs had to know the layout of the compound
intimately, so that advance assignments could be made for individual
SEALs: which SEALs were to attack guards - and where; which SEALs would
search for Bin Laden - and where, etc.
Once the above requirements were met, and an assault was planned, CIA
would be tasked to provide intensive 24 hour real-time visual coverage
– again by CIA officers, not Pakistanis - of the compound in the last
days and hours before the raid was mounted, and probably to assist in
"bringing in" the SEAL helicopters This would involve
deploying CIA officers familiar with the target and equipped with
satellite communications which kept them in direct contact with the
Station, Headquarters, the appropriate US military command in
Afghanistan, US military commanders in Pakistan,and the SEAL strike
force. Note: this would, I suspect, include real-time video coverage.
I also assume that CIA officers, perhaps shepherding a few SEALs, were
in the immediate vicinity of the compound, “illuminating” it with
laser and/or infra-red to assist the helicopters bringing in the SEAL
assault team: there could be no last minute confusion on the part of the
helicopter pilots as to where the target was located.
The point of this absolutely crucial last-minute coverage would be to:
Ensure UBL was in the compound when the assault team arrived.
Watch for any possible reinforcement of the guard force; and/or changes
in guard deployment in the compound.
The key thing as regards all the above is that it had to be accomplished
without tipping off the occupants of the compound, the many “locals”
who live in the immediate area, and, I assume, Pak intelligence. The
practical difficulty of doing this is enormous. The compound is smack in
the middle of an urban area which is also a major Pakistan Army military
base. The degree of professionalism – operational tradecraft and
technical skills - needed by the CIA officers responsible for conducting
the operation while remaining undetected by both “friend” and foe
cannot be overstated.
Without all of the above requirements/actions having been met, the
assault would not have been launched. The fact that it succeeded,
apparently in textbook manner, is a real credit to CIA's Clandestine
Service officers.
And, of course, to the SEALs, who clearly carried out their complex and
dangerous mission with unmatched bravery and skill.
Bless them all.
And … thanks, guys. You have given us all a real shot in the arm. We
are proud of you, and glad you were on deck and come home safe.
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Interesting comments from
a former SEAL to a radio show
RUSH: To North Carolina. This is Greg, who says he's a former SEAL. It's great to have you on the program, sir. Welcome.
CALLER: Hello, Mr. Limbaugh. The reason I called was -- well, first, a minor point -- that the term "assaulter, "when used in reference to Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and correct. Naval Special Warfare Development Group is -- and, by the way, anything I'm gonna say is available, open source. There's nothing that is privileged.
RUSH: All right.
CALLER: Anyways, they are organized different than the other SEAL teams. They're organized into assault team -- or at least they were when I was there, which was some time ago. They do have a different organization because they have a different mission, and they have a different legal standing than the regular SEAL teams. They and their counterparts in the army, Combat Applications Group, work directly for the president of the United States. They cannot be used on missions unless it is authorized -- directly authorized -- through the President as national security advisor. They're not in the normal chain of command.
RUSH: Is this SEAL Team Six that we're talking about?
CALLER: They are what has developed from that SEAL team, which is now -- as far as I know -- decommissioned. But it is an interchangeable term, like Delta and
CAG.
RUSH: I see. Is there a SEAL Team Four, a SEAL Time Five?
CALLER: Oh, yes. Yeah, absolutely. But for lack of a better term, their conventional SEAL teams although they are special operations, and not to degrade them, they just have a slightly different mission.
RUSH: All right. So "assaulter" is a special term?
CALLER: "Assaulter," especially when using DEVGRU, yes. They're organizing to assault teams. They're not organized along the same lines as the regular SEAL teams.
RUSH: I didn't know that. I'm happy to know this.
CALLER: Yeah. Yep. Well, that's fundamental.
RUSH: How long ago was it that you served as a SEAL?
CALLER: I retired slightly right before 9/11 and I've been working as a "civilian," let's say, since then; but my duty in the teams was from the late seventies to the early 2000s.
RUSH: I can't imagine the training. I can't imagine the physical, gruesome aspects of the training you people have to go through to actually graduate and actually become parts of that unit. That's just amazing to me.
CALLER: It's fairly rigorous.
RUSH: Ha! Fairly rigorous.
CALLER: Yeah. But one thing I would like to say if you'd permit me, is I really believe that this decision... I believe that President Obama's hand was forced in this, and this is really just a crass political decision. When I hear people say that this took courage, I just believe he was absolutely forced into doing this.
RUSH: Yeah, because somebody came and said, "We got Osama." So he's got to do something.
CALLER: Exactly.
RUSH: We've got Osama so we've got to do something.
CALLER: Correct.
RUSH: Right.
CALLER: If he wouldn't have acted I assure you the information would have been leaked prior to the election cycle.
RUSH: Yeah.
CALLER: And he would have had to have dealt with that, and frankly if that came to knowledge late in the election cycle, our next president would be either Hillary Clinton or whoever the Republicans nominated.
RUSH: That's a great point. Gregg, I gotta run because of time but that's an excellent time and I don't think there's the any doubt about it. We'll be back.
BREAK TRANSCRIPT
RUSH: I believe that call. Our former SEAL was exactly right. Obama was forced into this. Look, he drag his feet as long as he could. What was it, eight months, they had five national security meetings? It was last August when Obama was first told about Bin Laden being available to be made fish food, and finally he did act on it.
END TRANSCRIPT
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Osama
Bin Laden taken down by DevGru Navy SEALs
On Tue, May 3, 2011
Erasmo "Doc" Riojas <docrio45 [at] gmail DOT com> wrote:
Thank you guys for keeping me in your email roster.
All that stuff about DEVGRU being the very best? well, they just proved it; but I think we did
stuff like that in Vietnam and the President did not even see our pictures.
I am not jealous, actually, I am proud that the Army Special Forces are still passing down great
"OPs" to Navy SEALs. We did real good with some of
their "hand-me-downs" in 'nam war games.
If it can be done, we , USNavy SEALs can do it.
DEVGRU has earned their combat pay, for sure!
HooYah!
Erasmo Rojas AKA: Doc Rio
still wasting O2 in Pearland TX. www.sealtwo.org
On Tue, May 3, 2011
Clay Sherman <clay.sherman [at] gmail DOT com> wrote:
Doc,
It's good to hear that you're still on this side of the dirt.
I am absolutely sure that this OP was not passed down to Six. SEALs have always taken a back seat to Special Forces, but, I believe, they have finally come into their own by being the consummate quiet professionals they have always been. Send in a squad, boat crew, team or squadron of SEALS and they will always get the results needed.
The powers that be have found this out and now SEALs are in very high demand. All you have to do in this day and age is see who is running SOCOM and you may soon see that his replacement is another SEAL. In an older day that command went back and forth from Army to Air Force. I'm sure that the very last thing these door kickers wanted was any type of media attention and I am willing to bet that it wasn't their idea to have them be wired for video.
You and I know that this "elite of the elite" is a bit stretched; but that is the way the media sees it. The "conventional" SEAL Teams can do what they did but they certainly couldn't do it as well. The only reason for this is practice and job description. Prior to Grenada the only training Six did was counter-terrorism and there wasn't anyone, in my opinion, including Delta that could do room clearance as well as they could.
Grenada showed them that they needed to diversify a bit into the conventional SEAL roles. They did diversify but except for shooting skills the other SEAL Teams, in my opinion, were better then they were at unconventional warfare. Attrition at BUD/S is, what, about 75% so you get someone intelligent, in excellent shape and who will not quit.
After you have gained experience at one of the Teams you might decide that you want to go to SIX. Now this is because you truly want to do that work and, of course, you have to pass their screening process. It is not because you are considered to be in the upper 1% of the Naval Special Warfare Community like their evaluations say.
You have to be the type of person they are looking for but as you and I know there are plenty of SEALs who are as good but choose a different path, choose to stay in the conventional Teams. Because you don't go there does not mean that you are any less an Operator.
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I hope all is well with you.
Take care,
Clay
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